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Farm Labor: Key Conceptual and Measurement Issues on the Route
to Better Farm Cost and Return Estimates*
J . by Wallace E. Huffman • • -i •.
• -•Labor-is one* of-the important inputs in agricultural production. :How it
is measured and- valued is.'important for establishing the marginal cost .of
agricultural . commodities and .laborfs- share* .of the. icost . of. production.
Historically in agricultural commodity cost?return methods,' labor and management
have been treated as distinct, unrelated, or disconnected inputs. A variety of
reasons undoubtedly exist for this separation. .The^perspective that leads to a
separation of;labor and management, however,•as hot in tune.-.with-advances'-over
the. past two .decades in the-modern concept of labor from.labor.economics or with
econometric studies of. off-farm labor ^supply of farm household ..members and
agricultural production. . , . , . ^ ^
• The objective of this, paper is to.provide a perspective on past methods used
to measure the cost of .farm, labor and management .and to provide" recommendations
for improved procedures. This latter task also involves providing an assessment
and evaluation of alternative procedures.i j . . /
Here, "labor" is .viewed as encompassing all the productive activities of
individuals or ^human beings used •in'~a business. This includesi.a wide range of
human services, including physical ability to do work and decision making. Farm
labor, is a subset of all labor, and farm labor is viewed broadly as encompassing
*A draft, of this, paper was originally prepared: for the-Farm Labor-and-Management
Subcommittee of the AAEA Farm Commodity Cost and Returns Task Force, July 1992.
The author -is professor•:of Economics, and Agricultural Economics,.-- Iowa State
University. Project 2738 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment
Station, Ames, Iowa.
2a wide range of human activities required in farming, for example, human time
spent in planning, managing, marketing, supervising, producing, accounting, and
technology assessment. For some purposes, it may be useful to refer to the input
category as "labor and related services." The related services include all those
purchased services that are highly substitutable for unpaid and hired farm labor,
i.e., all labor or human services acquired through farm labor contractors,
mechanics, repair services, information and management services, and bookkeepers.
The task is undertaken in the following sections.
A Brief Review of the Cost of Labor
In the cost-return methods used by the Agriculture and Rural Economy
Division, ERS, USDA (Morehart et al. 1992, p. 6-7), unpaid farm labor, which is
the time contributed by the operator, partners, and in some cases family members,
has been treated differently than hired farm labor. The Division has adopted an
arbitrary classification of "economic costs." Their "economic costs" are
supposed to be full-ownership costs from a long-term perspective. These costs
are defined as variable cash expenses, general farm overhead, taxes and
insurance, capital replacement, allocated returns to the capital invested in the
production process, unpaid labor, and land (Morehart, Johnson, and Shapouri
1992). Expenditures on hired labor are counted as "variable cash cost," but the
Division does not estimate variable "noncash costs." Its variable cost measure
ignores unpaid farm labor and other unpaid factors. Hence, it does not obtain
marginal cost of production estimates!
The Division's "economic cost" of production can ' be described as an
approximation to average cost of production. In this economic cost calculation,
a value to unpaid farm labor is imputed based on estimated hours worked on the
farm and the average wage rate"for hired farm, labor (Morehard, Shapouri, and
Dismakes 1992, p. 7). - A.residual is also defined as gross value of production
-less total "economic costs" and labeled ".return ,to management •and risk." This
residual is clearly commodity iprice.(market price or ex post) : determined, and
hence it is .not. commodity, price determining. Furthermore, it. is most likely
primarily measuring effects of, random* events; including weather and measurement
errors. - - ,, • ii > •
In making .^economic cost" .estimates of particular, agricultural commodities,
ARED has allocated noncash costs to each commodity based upon its share of the
total value of >agricultura.l production. " ^ This ' allocation scheme ignores
differences in and information about the-iiiipaid farm labor intensity of different
agricultural commodities and has important implication for .relative cost of
production. - . . .. ; . _ ,
Methods similar to those. employed by: the ARED-have been used by some
•agricultural economics in.making cost-return estimates. See Klonsky 1992, p. 151
for a summary; also see Miller 1992a; b, ;p. 359. Another approach is to charge
current family living expenses." against, the farm business as .a cost of unpaid •
family , labor as in beef- cow-calf-budgets,-, e.g. McGrann 1991. • .This approach
n^iS^^ seem at first to be, appealing because.'^ a- farm family must' certainly "make
a living." Under more careful examination, however, we realize that this measure
, of cost is primarily determined by the preferences of the household (for leisure
relative to purchased inputs to consumption) and the total, resource constraint
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has only a minor connection .to farming, e.g., since 1975 the farm share of farm
household .net- cash income from.all sources ,has/.averaged less than 50 percent
(USDA 1990., 1991c). ... , ....
4The Resources and Technology Division of ERS Is in charge of creating
agricultural productivity and efficiency statistics (see Hauver 1989). Before
1985, "labor requirement data," which assumes a level of efficiency that may be
quite different from actual efficiency, were used in the USDA's productivity
statistics, but starting in 1985, farm labor usage has been survey based. In the
new procedure, total labor use on farms is estimated using information contained
in two surveys, the Farm Costs and Returns Survey and the Current Population
Survey. These new data do not provide commodity-specific Information on farm
labor use.
The R&T Division has valued the farm labor input using an opportunity cost
concept, but the exact procedure has changed. First, they used the average wage
rate for hired farm labor as the value of all farm labor (Hauver 1989). More
recently, they have valued unpaid farm labor at the wage or salary for "similarly
skilled" wage and salary workers in U.S. agriculture, where homogenous skill
groups are defined by gender, age, education, and occupational group. This
procedure Is similar to the one used by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Framueni (1987)
in their 30+ sector multifactor productivity analysis of the U.S. economy. Thus,
although productivity and cost-returns data are created for different purposes,
one might reasonably ask why the procedures for measuring costs are so different
between productivity and cost-returns approaches.
Research on off-farm labor supply decisions of farm households has
contributed to improved modeling of human time use and valuation for farm
household members.. In this work, models for an individual have a constraint of
7,860 hours per year to allocate to farm work, off-farm work, and leisure (or
household and personal activities). In these models, husband's and wife's time
are treated as being heterogeneous because they possess different skill, and the
, 5
opportunity cost-of. time allocated to-farm-workvis the maximum, of the marginal
-..value of a unit of time- allocated:toj offrfarm work or leisure. ,.,For off-farm work
to occur, the opportunity^cos.t of an individuals's time-ibecomes"his or her off-
farm wage rate, and this is the price.of unpaid familyrlabor for making household
and farm resource allocation^decisions.and. for entering..the calculation-of the
marginal cost of agricultural'commodities (Huffman 1996). ; See .Huffman (1980),
Sumner (1982), Huffman and Lange (1987), and Tokle and Huffman (1991), and
Hallberg, Findeis, and Lass (1991) for further discussion of .these; models and the
empirical results. - .,r:
. -The above examples, provide evidence^ that very: different procedures are used
by agricultural economists 'today for .defining, the" economic cost^of agricultural
. commodities,, including major inconsistencies in the treatment of unpaid-farm
.labor.-, These-i differences .-have. major implications for .. the,^marginal-cost of
agricultural commodities, including the relative marginal cost of commodities.
The Nature of .Cost and the >. •
Cost of Unpaid Labor
The first subsection contains an examination of the concept of economic, or
opportunity cost, placing particular emphasis on unpaid farm labor. In the
second subsection, the fixed costs associated with employment are considered.
3 «k. '
In the third subsection, an economic model of farm household decisions is
presented. In this subsection, a conceptual framework is presented in which the
decisions of farm households on consumption and production are formulated
jointly. This framework is useful for helping to see the "big" picture on the
complex resource allocation decisions of farm households. The model is about
plans and is an important guide to the real data that one needs for meaningful
measures of the marginal cost of production. It is one that requires simplifying
6and ignoring some of the secondary decisions. The approach, however, can be
expected to lead to a better approximation to the "true" economic and resource
allocations of farm households. After grasping the overall approach, it is
fairly easy to make application of the basic principles to secondary decisions.
In the fourth section, the issue of getting the price/cost of unpaid farm labor
right, not too high and not too low is addressed.
The Nature of Cost.
Although historic cost is the primary concept used by accountants (and the
IRS), economic costs are a different concept.^ The basic concept of economic
cost is opportunity cost: "The cost of any productive service to use A is the
maximum amount it could produce (or be paid or sold for) elsewhere. The foregone
alternative is the cost. Note that the alternative cost sets the value of the
resource to use A" (Stigler 1966, p. 105).
Although it is seldom the case that a direct quote is in the correct context
for the task at hand, direct quotations from Stigler (1966) are an exception in
this case because he spent a number of years at Iowa State College attempting to
solve and improve the thinking about resource allocation problems of Iowa farmers
and later received a Nobel Prize. Furthermore, he uses a number of ex^ples that
are directly relevant to our task.
The alternative use of a resource depends upon the context or use to which
the cost is being reckoned:
« *
1. "The cost of an acre of land to agricultural uses is the amount
the land could yield in nonagricultural uses (residences, parks,
and so on).
72.. The cost bf'an acre of land to-the wheat growing industry is the'
amount-it would yield in other agricultural crops (oats, corn
and so on), as well asi in nonagrictiltural uses. '
3. The cost-of an acre of land to wheat fanner X is' the amount the
land could yield to other.wheat farmers, as well as all non-
wheat uses.- . - • , •
If all land were homogenous in all relevant-respects (including location,
fertility,.-and the like), obviously all three of. these alternative costs would
be the same. For if land yielded more' in nonagricultural uses than - in
agricultural uses, some of it would be transferred to the nonagricultural uses,
and the transfer would go on until the .yields in all uses were equal (under
competition). Equality of yields of a resource in every feasible- use is
necessary to maximum return for the individual owners rof the...resource; any
discrepancy in yields is (with competition) an opportunity to someone to increase
his income. But if the land is not homogeneous, it is not necessary that these
alternative costs be equal." (Stigler 1966, p. 105-106.) '
Suppose thatrdue'to locational and other factors, an acre of one type-of land
will yield $50 in wheat, $30 in other farm crops, and $5 in nonagricultural uses.
Then the economic cost of the land to the wheat industry is $30 an acre--the best
forgone alternative. This cost is, however, decisive^ to .the. land's use: even
if a declining demand forces the yield in wheat down to. $31, the land will not
be transferred to other uses. But from the Viewpoint of any tenant wheat farmer,
•a land rent of $50 is the cost because tat $49.99 it will'be rented to another
farmer. . Furthermore, -a superior farmer, it might be .believed,.can get .more than
the average yield from the land. So he. (or she) can, but. it is the* value, of the
8marginal product of land that constitutes its yield, and this marginal product
will not differ in equilibrium between superior and inferior farmers. (See
Stigler 1966, p. 106.) Thus, using opportunity cost as the appropriate concept
of economic cost clearly avoids the paradoxes encountered by historical costs.
All productive services, inputs, or conanodities that are identical necessarily
have the same alternative cost, no matter what the differences in their
historical costs.
Of course, the alternative uses of a resource will frequently be different,
and in fact fewer, in the short run than in the long run. This is obviously true
for a machine: during its life it can be used only for the purposes for which it
was designed, or as scrap. For labor, however, there are more options even in
the short run (Stigler 1966, p. 107). A farmer has as alternative occupations
only those occupations that can make use of his general ability and skill at
farming. But given sufficient time to be retrained, he(she) can work in
occupations that require other skills. Given still more time, many individuals
who otherwise would have entered this occupation can enter one of a hundred or
more occupations, requiring similar inherent abilities.
The alternatives to a given use of a resource frequently include nonmonetary
elements. In the employment of labor, they include conditions of work, prestige,
riskiness and other similar factors. These nonmonetary elements obviously must
be reckoned with monetary returns in analyzing the allocation of resources among
uses because they affect decisions (Stigler 1966, p. 108). The equilibrium
difference in monetary returns will measure the difference in nonmonetary
elements only at the margin. For example, if the equilibrium money labor income
of a farmer is 20 percent less than that of a comparable urban worker, there will
be many farmers for whom the value of nonmonetary aspects are larger, and some
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• who-would-not leave farming even if labor income fell to 50 percent-of the urban
levels Those farmers who would be-willing to remain in farming even~.at a 50
percent differential are'earning ^ economic rent'on their "scarce pr^erence"
^ -when the equilibriwB differential is only 20 percent (Sti'gler-1966, . p. 109) .
• The surplus' of actual' labor earning over what can be earned in the best
alternative use is called a'rent; :or quasi-rent (Stigler 1966", p...l06). As-the
name suggests, economists first attached this concept ofji price' or'return higher
than needed to hold a resource in a particular^'use, to land: - The concept has
since been generalized to include such- returns as received by- labor or' other
owners of heterogenous resources'(Stigler-"1966; p. -106) . Thus, the opportunity
cost of a resource is price determining or^an-iiiq}ortant signal ' for production
(and consunq>tion) units, but the surplus or quasi-rent' is price determined, an
ex post ph^omena. The rent might be important for future human capital
investment decisions. This helps to distinguish which- concepts--of cost are
relevant for affecting current resource allocation- decisions^ and the marginal
cost of producing agricultural "commodities^'" The relevant concept is opportunity
cost .and not''historic^-cost, actual cash outlays or-quasi-rents. '
' Some fine-tuning of^ the opportunity.^" cost of- labor": in rural' labor markets
that do not function^smoothly-can be achieved, •Harberger (1971) concludes that
measuring the -opportunity cost -of • labor- in'rural areas by the-value" of the
- product forgone is generally inferior to some other measures. He-concludes that
the preferable measure of opportunity cost is "the supply price of-marginal units
of labor for given skill characteristics 'and^labor market areas-where the workers
will work and live" (Harberger'1971; p. "559). He also"concludes that the'best
wage is the one where a majority of. the ^firms-are motivated by profit and no one
firm dominates employment. In .particular, -the wage '-rate -paid government
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employees and paid by companies in "one-company towns" is not a good measure of
the opportunity cost of labor. Furthermore, by using the real wage rate for the
area where the employees will live and work, this corrects properly for cost of
living differences between sending and receiving areas (when they differ). He
also argues that when one uses the market clearing wage, there is no need to
adjust the wage rate for local or national cyclical unemplojrment (differences).
Thus, the story from Stigler and Harberger about the opportunity cost of
unpaid farm labor is as follows:
1. The cost of a lanit of unpaid labor used in farming is the supply
price or market price for the labor in nonfarm employment.
2. The cost of a unit of unpaid farm labor used in livestock
production is the value of the labor used in crop production
or in nonfarm employment.
3. The cost of a unit of unpaid farm labor used in swine production
is the value of the labor to other livestock enterprises, to
crop enterprises, or to nonfarm emplojnnent.
In labor market equilibrium, the marginal value .of a unit of homogeneous
labor will be the same in all of these uses, i.e. the opportunity cost of a
marginal unit of unpaid labor using in farming is the market price of labor in
nonfarm use. Furthermore, if Che value of the marginal product of a unit of
unpaid farm labor (in farming) is larger than the off-farm wage rate for similar
skilled labor, the economic cost of this unpaid labor remains at the off-farm
wage. The excess of the value of the marginal product over the off-farm wage is
an economic rent or quasi-rent. But reductions in the price of farm output can
occur to the point that this rent is slightly above zero and not affect optimal
resource allocation between farm and nonfarm uses or among farming enterprises.
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Furthermore, the opportunity cost of unpaid farm labor is not generally affected
'by the size of the farming enterprise, i.e., a unit of unpaid farm laboV for an
operator of a large and a'small farm has the ~same cost,' if they have they face
• 'i ;1- ' • • . • • r <• -7 .i • •
the same off-farm wage! In fact, small farming operations may be a signal of
high opportunity cost of the operator. - , . .
There is no problem in principle with the opportunity cost of a marginal xmit
of unpaid farm labor being its value in leisure or household activities. This
is frequently the correct choice for particular' farms. The value of human time
used in leisure or household activities, however,"is not the appropriate choice
for a national' cost-returns methodology. Tlie reason is tHat each individual and
Household has Its own subjective assessment of the value of a"^ unit of leisure
time, and it is not easy to identify what it "is'. Thus, for a general methodology
and one that represents a good approximation," we need an objective yardstick for
determining the opportunity cost^bf latJor, i.e., we need "farmers to tell 'us the
hours of farm work but we need an outside estimate of the marginal value of a
unit of farm work. " ' ' '
'^Although sOme might object that the functioning of the 'labor market is
"unfair," a market where voluntary^exchange of labor'^amdng a sizeable niamber of
buyer's and sellers Is" occurring" is an incredibly "effective and efficieht
mechanism for pooling together information from diverse sources'*ahd assessing
quality differences objectively (see Rosen 1986"; Willis 1986"Harberger 1971).
In other words it is an effective mechanism' for settling disputes about economic
value. Although the market price may in^some cases need to be modified for
external effects and taxes and subisidies to attain correct measures' of thie social
opportunity cost of labor (e.g; see Just'/ Hueth', '^ and Schmitz" 1982)', there really
is no good substitute for starting from a base of market prices or wage rates.
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Fixed and Transactions Costs Associated with Employment
Costs associated with entry and exit of workers from firms are a type of
firm-specific investment in employees, or part of the whole-farm cost of farm
labor. These are sometimes referred to as fixed labor costs or once-over costs
because they occur before any productive work has occurred or at termination of
an employee. These costs are largely independent of the nxomber of hours or the
intensity with which an employee works and can be whole farm or commodity
specific. To the firm, the costs of new employees take the form of lost output
of the person(s) engaged in hiring and screening prospective workers and the
trainees and persons leading or supervising the training. Also, there is a
finite probability that a firm will at some stage wish to dispense with the
services of any employee it hires. The firm thus incurs a future expected set
of once-over fixed costs each time it hires a new employee--the potential cost
to the business or firm associated with unsatisfactory performance (Elliott 1991,
p. 252).
Thus, once a firm and employee have chosen to cooperate, the fixed costs
associated with employment tend "to lock" them together in long-term
relationships. In agriculture, the fixed costs, sometimes called transactions
costs, are frequently large enough to block the use of skilled or specialized
"outside" labor services.
This is an issue addressed many years ago by Coase (1937) when he considered
the nature of the firm and by Stigler (1951), Rosen (1983), and Becker (1989)
when they considered the division of labor. The issue is which activities are
conducted within a firm or business and which ones are obtained through an
exchange with other firms. They concluded that the size of the costs associated
with business contracts are a critical factor in the outcome. When transactions
costs are low for interfirm exchanges, firms specialize and do business with each
^3
otherWhen ihterflrm transactions costs, are' high, a glven> firm or company
conducts a wide range of activities through ihtrafirm or vertically integrated
activities. • -
For farm households, the fixed cost of finding'labor .servicesi and paying for
the time in transit for having^them'come to the farm (i.e. the trip charge) or
for. finding, .showing, or training someone to complete .a small job are too large
to.be a profitable undertaking. For example, very few farms can rely on nonfarm
repair services^to fix dally .breakdowns in farm machinery and equipment. -.The
transaction costsIncluding time delays, of getting a repair service to the farm
are too large. Thus, most farm businesses have some employee, possibly, the. farm
operator, -who has adequate skills for making ..daily repairs . of equipment and
machinery. Major overhauls of equipment,, e.g., tractor engines, are, however,
usually obtained from skilled mechanics located in major nonfarm repair shops
where the needed instruments and tools are .present-; Likewise-, the transaction
costs of having a veterinarian/come to a farm are. too large in most cases to be
a profitable activity,for performing routine .delivery of offspring, castration
and vaccination, of farm animals. Problem .births-.and treatment, of sick-or
diseased animals, however j -largely .require the. skills .of licensed veterinarians.
Farmers and ranchers, however, know that treating sick animals is a very labor
intensive activity, hence expensive, and they can and do reduce the need for
veterinary services by investing in preventative medicine,- e.g. -vaccination for
contagious diseases, use of medicated feeds and water.
In fruit. *and vegetable production,....much of the hiring of workers is for
seasonal or relatively shortrterm employment, although the work-reoccurs on an
annual basis generally. Thus, the fixed cost of hiring and training these
workers plays an Important. role in where, when, and how this - activity is
conducted.. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)irequlres all
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employers of new hired farm labor to check doc\jinents within 24 hours to see if
each worker appears to be eligible to work. For seasonal agricultural service
workers, the employer must record information about workers and send it to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
In California, Arizona, and Florida, the institution of farm labor
contractors (FLC) has evolved rapidly after IRCA and serves as an intermediary
between growers and seasonal farm workers to reduce employment-related
transactions costs (Martin and Holt 1987; Martin 1987; Econ. Dev. Dept. 1990, EDD
1990). The growers contact with the farm labor contractors (FLC) for labor
services, the FLC then becomes the employer, and the farm labor contractors
handle all of the hiring, transporting, housing, supervising, and paying of the
workers. This institution seems to have reduced the liability of growers
associated with using undocumented foreign workers, for housing, and for health
and safety in the fields (Martin 1991). Also it has reduced the cost of checking
workers' docviments because farm-labor contractors generally employ crews for a
whole season and the crews usually work for a number of different growers. This
arrangement also has the indirect effect that the growers have much less
knowledge about the quantity and quality of work being done by seasonal
agricultural workers in their fields.
An Economic Hodel of Farm Household Decisions
One very useful way to gain insights about how economic costing of
agricultural commodities should be undertaken is to first model the consumption
and production decisions of farm households and then think about how one would
collect data so as to provide good empirical measures of our concepts. The model
presented here is one in which an agricultural household makes plans, say at the
beginning of the calendar year, on all of its household and farm decisions for
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the year. See Huffman (1991a), Strauss (1986), and Hallberget al. (1991) for
a review of these agricultural household models. To simplify and to cut to the
essence of basic economic issues, these decisions are considered in a static
model with certainty. Also, -the-financial-aspects of 'farm household decisions
is ignored here.
The household receives utility or satisfaction from the direct (or indirect)
consumption of the farm operator's and spouse's leisure, Lf and L3 respectively,
and from goods purchased in the market, X: ~
(2) U - U(Lf, L^; X; r)
where r is a taste (technology or environmental) parameter. The household
receives an annual endowment of human time'for the operator and spouse
(Tf and Tg) . Although approximately 10 percent of the farm operators are women
(Kalbacher 1985), this'analysis proceeds under the assumption that all farm
operators are male aiid all spouses, are female. This time of the husband and wife
is assumed to be heterogenous because of human capital, physical strength and
other differences. Each person's time is allocated potentially to leisure (Lj^),
own-farm work (H^^), and off-farm work (Hj^2) • '
(3) TjL — + HjL2. > 0, 11^2 ^ Oi s,
where boundary-constraints are imposed on wife's farm work •and husband's and
wife's off-farm work to-insure zero or positive optimal hours of wife's farm work
and (or) zero hours- of husband's and wife's off-farm work.
Heterogenous unpaid and hired farm labor. The technology of' farm production is
represented by the asymmetric representation of the transformation function:
(4) Qi - F(Q2S Hfi, Hgi. Y; 7) . - r
where and Q2 are'outputs, for example could be an aggregate of crop outputs
and Q2 an aggregate of livestock outputs'or they could represent particular
commodities. Hj^^ is hours of unpaid farm work,' Y is a vector of purchased
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inputs, which can include hired-farm labor, and 7 is a technology or efficiency
parameter. Both the transformation function and utility function are assvimed to
be continuous and strictly concave functions...
The farm household is assumed to face a- real cash income constraint in making
plans:
. (5) X - Pi Qi + ?2 Q2 - Wy Y+ Wf Hf2 + + V -
where Pj., j - 1,2, is the real price of farm outputs,; Wy is the real price^ of
purchased farm inputs; i-f,s, is the real wage per hours of off-farm work by
the husband and wife; V-C^ is real household nonfarm asset income less real fixed
cost associated with the household and farm, including "trip charges" for service
calls and one-time direct training and hiring cost for hired labor. Net
household real cash income is spent.on X, the-.purchased input for consumption;
• and all nominal magnitudes in the cash-income constraint have been converted to
real magnitudes by dividing through by the price of X^ Saving is. ignored
in this static model, and if a household does not market Qj in the year of
production, the household can obtain a zero interest loan at the market price
per unit of the unsold commodity and it uses calendar-year accrual-based
0
accounting. . ^
. The household/business faces competitive prices for all outputs and inputs.
The wage rate for off-farm work is assumed to depend on the individual's
(or husband's or wife's) -attributes (^) and local labor market and job
characteristics (^):
(6) - Wi (Ci, :i>). '
Two separate wage functions are suggested primarily because of differences in the
quality of-measured, individual characteristics (E's) and possibly due to wage
differences that have gender" differences due to thin rural labor markets,
including discrimination. See Willis (1986) ,• Rosen (1986) , Topel (1986) , Briggs
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(1986).
. > * • » • .
This representative household faces 10 major household consumption and farm
production decisions and is assxjmed to make them by maximizing utility, equation
(2), subject to equality constraints on cash income .and technology of farm
production (equations (4) and (5) combined), and human time of the operator and
spouse, equation (3). There are also three inequality constraints on human time
allocation. The solution to the optimizing problem is impqrtant because it
provides information about the marginal value of unpaid farm labor and the
marginal cost of agricultural commodities.
The first-order conditions for optimal allocation or plans are obtained from
equation (7):
(7) ^ - U(Lf, Lg, X, r) + [P^. F(Q2, Hfi, Hgi, Y, 7) + P2 Q2 " WyY .
•+ Wf Hf2 .+ Wg H32 + V - Co - X] ,+ \2 [Tf,- Lf - Hfi - Hfg]
- + A3 [T3. - Lg - - Hs2]
with first-order conditions for an optimum of: >
(8) 3^/aLf = Ul^ - A2 - 0
(9) a^/SLg - Ul - A3 - 0.
S - * - * •
(10) a^/ax - Ujj - = 0
(11) a(6/aQ2 - Ai [Pi Fq2 + P2I - 0
(12) a^/aHfi - Pi - A2 - 0
(13) a^/aH^i - Ai Pi - A3 < 0, H^i > 0. H^i (Ai Pi Fh^^ - A3) - 0
(14) a^/aY - Ai [Pi Fy - Wy] - 0 ,
(15) 5^/3H£2 ~ - A2 < 0, H£2 ^ Pi ^f2 ^•^1 ^f ~ ^^2^
(16) a^/3Hs2 - >l,Ws - A3 < 0, Hs2 > 0, Hs2 Wg - A3) - 0
(17) dif>/dXi - Pi F(-) + P2 Q2 • Wy Y+ Wf Hf2 -+ Wg Hs2 + V-C^-X - 0
(18) 30/aA2 - Tf - Lf - Hfi - Hfj - 0
(19) a<i>/dX2 - Tg - L3 - Hgi - H32 - 0
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where U, - au/ai» i - Lf, Lg, X, and - 3Q2/3r - 3F/Sr, r - Y.
(Note Fq^ < 0 or additional output Q2 requires a reduction in Qj^, holding inputs
constant.)
For an interior solution on all these optimal quantities, equation (15) and
(16) imply that Wf - " ^3/^1* Then, from equations (8) and (10):
- X2/^i - Wf and from equations (9) and (10): - ^s/^l " ^s'
from equation (12) " ^2/^1 " from equation
(13) ^1 ^ " ^3/^1 " ^s* Thus, under these conditions:
(19) - ?i Fjj^^ - Wf, and (19) Fjj^^ " ^s' optimal plan,
the time of the husband (wife) is allocated such that for an optimal plan the
marginal value of an hour is the same for leisure, own-farm work, and off-farm
work. Furthermore, these values are market determined (rather than internal to
consximption and (or) farm production decisions) or equal to the individual's real
wage for off-farm work.^ Thus, because of the comprehensive accounting for an
individual's time in this and similar models, the opportunity cost of time can
never be zero. The reason is human time always has a positive value in leisure,
even in the short-run.
Human attributes that affect wage offers generally differ across individuals,
and the local conditions are different when households reside in different
localities. Across households the real wage (or demand for labor faced by the
i-th individual) is in general different because the wage is a function of the
individual's attributes (O . e-g-i years of schooling completed, potential labor
market experience, and local (relative to residence) economic conditions (\t),
i.e., the anticipated local growth in jobs, anticipated unemployment rate, and
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amenities and unanticipated shocks to local labor demand^and .unemployment
' - I:.ooking further at the production decisions,^equati6n. (11) .implies that the
optimal quantity of output Q2> e.g., of livestock, is where marginal revenue from
an added unit of Q2 equals the marginal loss of revenue from the' associated
reduction in output.e.g. j of' crop output', .required to. free up enough
resources to increase Q2. Equation (14) implies that the optimal .quantity of
purchased farm inputs is such that the value of the'marginal product of the input
equals its marginal cost. Because the "prices" of Q]^, Q2, and Y are
determined in the market, the marginal conditions associated with these choices
meet the criterion of profit maximization. Profit, however, is defined to
include the opportunity cost of operator's and spouse*s farm labor:
(21) n - Pi F(Q2, Hfi. H3I . Y; 7) + P2 Q2 - Py Y - Wf Hfi - W3 - C*.
where is fixed cost associated with the farm business. Furthermore, there
might be difficulty in separating the fixed cost of joint-use fixed items, and
this would prevent separability and cause jointness of production and consiuaption
decisions.
Assuming separability of farm from consumption decisions, the optimal
decision rules for these variables can be obtained by considering the farm
production decisions separate from the household consumption and labor supply
decisions:
(22) Z* - (Pi. P2. Py, Hf, W3, 7), z - Q2, Hfi, H3I, Y,
and the supply function for is obtained by substitution:
(23) qf- F(Qi h;^i, H*i, Y*: y) -Sq^(Fi. P2, Py, Wf. W^. 7).
Because of an economic duality between the maximization of output subject to
a cost constraint and minimization of cost for given technology, we can recover
\ J • •
the farm cost function for and Q2 associated with the solution to profit
- , / ( 4 j , ' • ' , ,
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inaxlmlzation. The marginal cost function can then be derived from "the" cost
function (Diewert 1973; Chambers 1988). We can then obtain the minimum cost
fwction:
(24) C - C(Qi^ Q2. Py. Wf, W3. 7).
By differentiating (24) with respect to Qj, we can obtain the marginal cost
functions:
(25) MCj - ^ - Cj (Qi, Q2, Py, Wf. Wg. 7). j - 1,2.
In general, the marginal cost of Qj depends on the exogenously determined (to the
household) farm inputs prices Py, Wj, and Wg, the technology parameter 7, and the
output rates and Q2' technology for the two outputs is separable (not
joint) and constant-return-to-scale in variable Inputs exists, then two separate
marginal cost functions can be written so that they do not depend on the quantity
of or Q2 produced. MCj - ^jC^y "f, Wg, 7), or it, depends only on exogenous
to the business input prices and the technology parameter. If we have data on
prices and quantities, we can In essence estimate the parameters of an algebraic
representation of the cost function. From It we can obtain the implied marginal
cost function for a particular commodity.
Given a maximum for n, say n*, the household can make second-level decisions
on consumption and labor supply. It chooses Lf, Lg, and X subject to the
modified budget constraint of
(26) n* +Wf(Tf - Hfi - Lf) +Wf(Ts - H*1 - Lg) +V- X.
where " ^i ' ^il ' ^i- 1 " f.s, has been substituted for 11^2 the net cash
income constraint. (Note that variables possessing a superscript of * are no
longer choices but are an optimal behavioral function.) The optimal rules for
Lf, L*. and X* are:
(27) E* - ^E(Wf. Wg, V+ n*, r), E - Lf, Lg. X,
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which are fimctions of the (real) off-farm wage rates of the husband and wife,
(Wj^s), "exogenous real net Income."-'-V'.+ n , and the taste parameter r.
Furthermore, the optimal quantity of off-farm work is-obtained residually:
(28) H*2 - Ti - H*i - L* - ^2- Py. Wf. W^. V-Cq, y,' t) , and it is
a function of all the 'exogenous parameters in the^ general household .decision
problem ^^1" ^2» ^y» ^s' T)* i •• -i...-:,'
Returning to ^ the issue of the cost of unpaid ^farm labor-, it is the
"opportunity cost" or value of an hour of forgone off-farm work, or the off-farm
wage Furthermore, if we incorporate an income tax at a constant marginal
. rate t on cash Income into the analysis, the marginal return to an hour of off-
farm work is (1 -,t)W£ and farm work is (1 - t)?^: no distortion occurs
in the allocation of time between these two time consximing activities. However,
because the tax does not apply directly to leisure, the leisure-market-goods
choice is distorted by the tax, i.e. - (1-t) or , the leisure versus
work decision is distorted by the income tax.
If the husband, and (or) wife, do not work off-farm,, the marginal value of the
time of the nonworking individual is no, longer tied directly to the market. Its
marginal value is intemal to a household's consumption and farm decisions. In
these cases, all the consumption and farm production decisions of a household
.must be solved jointly as one large optimizing problem; the farm decisions cannot
be separated from the household consumption (and labor supply) decisions. Now
^i/^1 " ^1 ' Provided > 0, or optimal allocation of the
husband *s' (vifs's) time is such that the margina? value of an^hour used in farm
vork equals its marginal, value for leisure, and this marginal value is .larger
than the off-farm yage. Furthermore, the cost- of an- hour of unpaid farm labor
is the value of the.forgone leisure. ^ ,
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Although a farm household may be located in a region of the country where
off-farm work opportunities appear bleak, the household alvays, irrespective of
location, has the option of using time of its members for leisure, which is
sometimes called household production time (Michael and Becker 1973). Thus,
agricultural economists who model farm business decisions as if there are N hours
of time of a farm operator (spouse) that are "available" for farm work are making
an artificial and likely misleading approximation. The problem becomes
potenCislly serious when they also assume that this time has a zero opportunity
cost in nonfarm, including household, uses.
Taking a long-term perspective, one important aspect of leisure is time
invested to affect ones future health status. A week or two of vacation per year
and days off regularly during weekends and holidays are an input to future good
physical and mental health which enhances long-term labor productivity.
Performing domestic services around the house, caring for and supervising
children, shopping for goods, interacting with friends and relatives, and
sleeping are regular uses of human time that have positive and significant value
in a well functioning household, too (Juster and Stafford 1991). Not
participating in these activities is always one opportunity cost of farm work.
Homogeneous unpaid and hired farm labor. Up to this point, we have assumed that
hired farm labor (nonfamily members) is a different input than operator's or
spouse's farm labor, i.e., they are heterogenous inputs. Given that some
agricultural economists have implicitly assumed homogeneity, it seems useful to
examine this hypothesis. Furthermore, we assume that the local wage for farm and
off-farm work for an adult of a given gender is the same. The main modification
to the model of household decision making is to exclude hired labor from the
purchased farm inputs (Y) and to define new measures of farm labor inputs and a
- 23
new budget constraint as: -
(29) Hfi - Hfi + Yf-
(30) '
(31) .Pi F(.) '+ P2.Qi2 - WyY - Wf(Yf - Hf2)-+ Ws(Ys.- Hgz). + V - G^, - X
(32) Qi - F(Q2, Hfi, Hsi, Y', 7) - F(Q2. Tf - Lf + Yf. - Lg + Y^, Y', 7)
where Yf and Yg are- annual ^ hours-, of -male, and female .hired' farm • labor,
respectively, and equation (3) has been used to ,substitute away Hfand Hgi.
If Yj^ - ^ farm household is a net buyer of labor, of gender type i, and
/
if Y^ - Hi2 < it is a net seller. It will be nonoptimal for both
Hi2 > 0 and Y^ > 0, i.e., to both sell and buy labor of a given gender at the
same time, given homogeneity by g&ider and some fixed costs associated with
working.
Uhen equation (2) is maximized subject to equations (31)-(32), new first-
order conditions of central importance are:
(33) a^/aYf - Ai(Pi - Wf) - 0
(34) a^/SYg « Ai(Pi - Wg) - 0.
Thus, the optimal allocation of male (operator's) time is:
(35) - Pi Fjj^^ - Wf, if Yf - Hf2^ 0,
and of female/spouse's time is:
(36) Ul^/Ux - ?! - w;. If y; - H^2 "0-
The conclusions from this modification is the cost of operator's farm labor and
leisure is now the wage rate for hired farm labor. Thus, the key condition for
making the cost/price of unpaid family be the wage rate for hired farm labor is
for hired labor and family labor to be perfect substitutes 1-for-l in farm work.
The option of hiring farm labor that is homogeneous to farm family labor is
a mechanism for increasing the gender-specific time constraint of the farm
household. For example, an additional 100 hours of hired farm labor can in
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principle substitute perfectly for 100 hours of farm family labor, and a
household might choose to increase a member's consumption of leisure as a result.
Alternatively, the husband or wife could be freed from "physical farm work" and
apply this time to farm-business decision-making--managing, marketing, examining
new technologies.
Is it likely that hired farm labor is a perfect substitute for farm family
labor? Workers of a given gender are relatively homogenous in their ability to
do physical work. They, however, differ dramatically in abilities to do work
requiring particular skills. In the United States, family members have superior
skill on average (see Tables 1 and 2 for some evidence; USDA 1963, 1983, Huffman
1996). Also, farm family members generally have a stronger motive for timely,
responsible work decisions, e.g., to notice diseases, pests, or other problems
and to act to take care of them, to complete harvesting when conditions are
right, because they can reasonably expect to share in the profits of the farm
business. It is very difficult to establish incentives for hired farm labor so
that they have similar loyalties and responsibilities as farm family members
(Huffman 1991c). Thus, several reasons exist in the United States for farm
family and hired (nonfamily) farm labor to be imperfect substitutes in farming.
Getting the Price/Cost of Family Labor Right
In the previous section, implications for the cost/price of unpaid farm labor
were obtained. Here we examine the effects on the economic organization of farm
production, and the marginal cost of agricultural commodities of failing to get
the cost/price of unpaid farm labor "right." Consistent with the model in the
previous subsection, unpaid family labor is a variable cost of agricultural
production, and it is valued at its opportunity cost.
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To lllucldate ithe, issues, .assume (i) the technologies for producing and
Q2. are separable,- (ii). they require only, two inputsunpaid farm labor (Hj^) and
a composite of purchased inputs- (Y) , i.e., - Fi(Hi. Y) , i - 1,2, (iii) for any
given relative input price ratio, is always more unpaid labor intensive than
Q2, (iv) each technology exhibits constant-returns-tp-scale in the variables
inputs, and (v) no fixed costs, Cq - 0. Given these assumptions, all our
information about cost-minimizing production decisions can be represented on a
unit-isoquant graph, i.e., —1. To make the example clearer, think of as
dryland corn (or soybean) production and Q2 as dryland wheat productioji, or
as dairy (or swine) production and Q2 as range cattle (cow-calf) production.
These commodity "pairs" represent reasonable good approximations to the above
conditions currently for U.S. agriculture in terms of the average unpaid labor
intensity of production.
•. '1 • L' j, • , : •
The Lerner-Pearce diagram (see Johnson 1971, pp. 17-20) is used to display
the production information for the two-input two-output cost minimizing problem
(See figure 1) . The initial situation is defined using relative input-price line
'^ o'^ o figure 1. Cost minimization occurs at ej on isoquant Q]^ - 1 and at e^
on isoquant Q2 —1, and the marginal (and" average) costs of producing 1 unit of
Ql and Q2 are the same. Given that the"price of Y is going to remain fixed in
our analysis, the cost "of production can be" measured in units of Y in figure 1,
i.e., Y is the numeraire good or the yardstick. Thus, MC^ and AC^ (i-1,2) are
initially represented by the distance CqO; ' in figure 1. For the Initial
optimal input ratio is and unpaid labor's' share of the cost of production
is represented by C^yJ/CqO. For Q2, the optimal input ratio is k2°, and unpaid
labor's cost share is C^Y^/CqO. Clearly, is more unpaid labor intensive to
produce than Q2, and unpaid labor's share is lairger for Q]^. '
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Suppose the line represents a relative price of unpaid labor that is too
lav and the "correct" relative price/costs line is represented by the line C2C2
tangent to isoquant Q2 - 1 at e2 and by the line C^^^l tangent to isoquant -
1 at e^. This change in W/Wy resulted from an increase in W, holding Wy
constant. How have the economics of the problem changes? First, the cost/price
of unpaid labor has increased relative to the price of other variable inputs (Y).
This causes changes in the economic organization of production. There is a
substitution in production away from the input that has become more expensive in
the production of both outputs, i.e., the production of both outputs becomes
relatively less unpaid labor intensive, i.e., . Second, the marginal
cost of producing both farm outputs is increased. For Q]^ the new MC (AC) is
represented by the distance C]^0 > CqO, and for Q2, the distance C2O > CqO.
Third, the marginal (and average) cost of producing Q]^, the relatively unpaid
labor intensive output, has increased proportionally more than the marginal (and
average) cost of producing Q2. Thus, the relative marginal cost of Qj ^2
(liC]^/iiC2) has increased when we increased the cost/price of unpaid farm labor.
Clearly "undervaluing" unpaid farm labor (relative to the price of other
inputs) has very important implications for the economic organization of
production. The production of and Q2 is too (unpaid) labor intensive, the
marginal (and average) cost of both outputs is too low, and the relative MC is
distorted. Whether the input-cost shares change depends on the size of the
elasticity of substitution in production between the two inputs. If the
technology is of the well known Cobb-Douglas type, the input-cost shares are
unchanged. For other technologies, the inputs shares will change, depending on
the properties of the function. See Huffman (1996) for a review of long-term
trends in the human agent's (labor's) cost share in U.S. Agriculture production.
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We» however, can turn this issue on its head, reverse the .process-, and.see
the implications for. the. economic organization of production - of setting the
relative cost/price of unpaid labor "too high.'"' The. production of both-outputs
will .be too intensive in Y, the, marginal, (and average), cost of both outputs will
be too high,^ and the relative marginal.cost of..will.be::t€>o high compared to
the marginal cost of • ' . : . ; - • . ;
Thus, setting the wage/price/cost ofxunpaid farm labor too law or "too high"
•distorts the story about the cost economic organization of
agricultural- production cand the. absolute zand -relative marginal .cost, of
agricultural .commodities, Hence, the only.,escape from Inefficient distortions
and misinformation about the cost, of production- iS: to set or get the relative
inputs prices "right"--not "too high" and not "too low" -- even ,if this feat
seems bard to accomplish!
Methods for Improving the Measurement
of the Cost of Farm Labor
In this paper, labor is defined to be all of the time using productive
activities of hvtman beings. Farm labor is a subset of all labor, and a broad
definition makes for a relatively homogenous input category over time, as
specialization and change in the economic organization of our economy occur.
Economic incentives faced by farmers affect the extent and degree to which
purchased services are used as substitutes for more traditional unpaid hired farm
labor. For example, the economic incentives in IRCA have created an incentive
for farmers to use farm-labor contractors to acquire seasonal farm labor and
• I y . i ^ ' i ' t' , '
subcontract their crop to intermediaries for harvesting. Thus, if farm labor is
viewed too narrowly, labor services used in agriculture are underestimated
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significantly and a distorted picture of the magnitude of how they are changing
over time Is obtained.
Unpaid farm labor should be valued at Its opportunity cost at nonfarming
activities. Thus, for any individual doing unpaid farm labor during a period,
there Is only one price for his (her) time, Irrespective of how that time is used
in farming activities during that period. Furthermore, all of the farm labor and
related services should be treated as variable (economic) cost, irrespective of
whether it is "hired" or "unpaid" farm labor. The primary reason is that all
labor used in farming has immediate alternative or nonfarm uses, e.g., as
leisure, household work, off-farm work, etc., and hence. It is a variable
economic cost. Furthermore, the traditional calculation of return to (farm)
management does not provide any meaningful or useful Information and should be
discontinued.
Qxiantlty of Farm Labor
All of those purchased services that are highly substitutable for unpaid and
hired farm labor should be included in the input class called "labor and related
services." This would include all labor acquired through farm-labor contractors
and all semi-skilled services used in farming, including mechanics, machinery and
building repair services (labor only), information and management services, and
bookkeepers. It would not include the services of highly skilled professionals,
e.g., lawyers, tax accountants, and veterinarians.
Furthermore, the number-one priority for collecting data on the quantities
of labor and related services should be obtaining accurate estimates of "whole
annual farm uses" in hours. Counts of numbers of workers are not useful. Also,
we believe that farm labor data based primarily upon input-output coefficients
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or labor-requirements per-unit of output-are very unsatisfactory for cost-return
methods, and they should not be the primary source of. information about farm
labor use. Farm labor use should be. based primarily on data obtained from
surveying farmers.
Although some might be skeptical•about the quality of the information
obtained from surveys, the state of knowledge, about how to conduct good surveys
of time use are quite advanced (see Juster and Stafford 1991). Also, farmers can
be expected to know or' to be able to make reasonable estimates: of the use of
unpaid farm labor when the questions are asked appropriately. For example,
fairly accurate information on hours of farm labor by afarm'operator can be
obtained by the following procedure. First, identify the farm operator (or farm
operators) for a farm. Second, ask him(her) (or each of time) how many hours
he(she) allocated to each of farm work.(broadly defined), to off-farm work, to
work around the house, and to all other activities during the'last month (week).
This type' of question has the advantage of'having a control total on hours
allocated by a given individual to all uses of time during a day. Thus, an error
in the estimate of one use of time causes an offsetting error..In the opposite
direction in other uses of time. Most individuals have a relatively good
perception about how their time is allocated to major activities using this
procedure. ' -
Farmers can be expected to present much less reliable information about how
they allocate their time to particular farming activities, or commodities.' There
are several reasons for this outcome. First, farmers are frequently engaged in
a fairly wide range of activities during any day, week, month, or year. Human
recall for small details is difficult'for"everyone (Juster and Stafford 1991).
Second, farmers frequently use time that affects, more than one commodity or
enterprise. Thus, obtaining an estimate of exactly how much is to be allocated
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to each enterprise or commodity is arbitrary. We recommend that in the long
term, cost-return methods move away form all methods of estimating labor use that
require the application of highly subjective or arbitrary rules for allocating
time among commodities.
It seems best to obtain an estimate from a farm operator of the total amount
of labor (hired and iinpaid) used in a farm business during some period, say a
year (the "whole farm estimate"), then he (or she) be asked to allocate the share
of each of the major types (or cost) of labor to each major commodity or
enterprise. Again, it is important that information be collected in a way so
that shares sum to one (or 100 percent).
In the long term, econometric fitting of cost or profit functions is
recommended as a much better procedure for obtaining estimates of the marginal
cost of particular commodities when joint production occurs. The conceptual
framework for doing this was laid out in equations (24) and (25). Also, see
Antle and Capalbo 1988, Ch. 2. The econometric approach has the major advantage
of not requiring information on the specific allocation of inputs to jointly
produced outputs. It does require that a particular function form be chosen,
e.g., translog or generalized quadratic profit or cost function to represent the
technology, but the data on inputs and outputs that are required are just "whole
farm totals" on say an annual basis. Application of the above econometric
approach would eliminate the need for subjective or arbitrary allocation of farm
labor (or labor cost) among various commodities.
The Cost/Price of Labor
There are two main types of labor and associated services to be distinguished
here, "paid" and "unpaid" ones. For hired (not family, partners or shareholders)
labor and related purchased services, the cost should be measured as the cash-
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jequlvalenC cost of total cost or compensation,from-the-Lprd&dcet's point of view
(wages and salaries; farm-trip charges; .cash outlaysrron ..hiring,, screening,
dociunenting workers; cash and in-kind benefits, etc.) . Although nonwage benefits
are a smaller share'of- total compensatidn-for*farm,labor than for nonfarm labor,
the relative importance of the cost of benefits has been increasing and is most
likely to continue to increase. For children of farm families that are paid, a
wage, for farm work, the cost of this labor should be the actual wage paid,
provided that it appears to be reasonable given their age and skill.
For unpaid farm labor, the cost, even in the short-run, should be set at a
positive opportunity cost. For all operators, partners, and spouses, who are
adults, the cost of their time for national cost-return methods should be the
wage per hour for off-farm work. In particular, the predicted off-farm wage rate
r-. ' t o . i • . i _-o'. • - ,
for individuals with a given gender and having particular attributes, e.g.,
schooling, potential labor market experience, is a good approximation to the
opportunity cost of their farm labor for cost-returns methodology. This
procedure has the advantage of moving its determination into the hands of
relatively objective researchers. Data obtained from farmers on wages paid
spouses, partners, and shareholds are viewed as unreliable and should not be
used. For any particular farm, extension specialists can consider the value of
a unit of time used for vacation, household, or other nonmarket uses as the
appropriate opportunity cost, if it is higher that the off-farm wage for a
similarly skill worker in the area. This value of human time in nonmarket uses,
however, is not recommended for general cost-returns methodology use because of
its extremely subjective nature and problems in soliciting meaningful information
about its value from surveys.
For unpaid child labor, the value of their time is best set at the wage rate
for hired farm labor if they are 16 years of age or older and set at the local
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minimum wage if they are less than age 16. Much greater work is required to
obtain the opportunity wage for unpaid adult farm labor.
Methodology for Estimating the Opportunity
Cost of Unpaid Farm l^bor
Labor market information--wage rates and attributes of workers and locations-
-are major inputs for estimating the opportunity cost of xmpaid farm labor by the
off-farm wage rate paid for similarly skilled individuals. The procedure that
is recommended for translating information on attributes into wage rates is an
econometric one.
The Labor Market
The market for labor is abstract, not being so well defined in location
as the Chicago Board of Trade or a community livestock auction. It, however, is
a useful construct in which to define the context within which the buyers and
sellers of labor come together to determine the wage and allocation of labor
services (Elliott 1991, p. 4-5). The market for labor usually has a distinct
geographical dimension, e.g, a single town or city, a region (county or state),
or a country (United States). Typically labor economists are concerned with the
labor market for a particular skill or occupation, location or region, and point
in time.
Labor economists also find it useful to consider "the" market for labor.
Although this level of abstraction ignores complexities and heterogeneities of
labor, jobs, and locations, it acknowledges that through the process of mobility,
i.e. , promotions and investments in skills and moving geographically, each of the
separate sublabor markets are interlinked (Elliott 1991, p. 47; Stigler 1962).
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The labor services offered for sale in the. labor .market..exhibit considerable
degree of heterogeneity and tend- to be exchanged in submarkets. Individuals
differ in their formal education, type and amount of experience,,, physical and
mental, ability, motivation, aptitude for particular tasks or responsibilities,
leadership potential, and ability to,deal with uncertainty and to take risk. As
indicated above, formal education and: training create useful.skills and generally
raise a worker's. productivity _and. can offer substantial financial rewards to
workers. The .two major types, of skillsgeneral,;and specific, have profound
'effects on labor.compensation and-allocation and.decisions. As. the skills become
more specific, workers become more heterogeneous and their mobility decreases.
Mobility--geographical and .occupational-.-;is what provides the. linkages between
different labor markets (Elliott 1991,.pi 6; Rosen 1986; Huffman 1996).•
Equalizing Vage .Differentials. In labor- markets where employers are primarily
competitive firms-or businesses and a significant share (need not be all) of the
workers are mobile, the "theory of equalizing wage i differentials" is "the
fundamental-long-run labor market equilibrating mechanism" (Elliott 19.91, p. 313;
Rosen 1986). The value to prospective workers (and the cost to employers) of the
pecuniary and nonpecuniary aspects of jobs differ. jThe pecuniary aspects are the
financial aspects, the wage or salary profile over time, paid vacations,
employer contributions to retirement plans, and ^health insurance and other
directly costing benefits. . Nonpecuniary-aspects of jobs include .(but are not
limited to) flexibility, ,timing, . and location of work; opportunities, for
training, promotion or advancement; and on^ the job working-conditions--safety,
comfortableness and pleasantness, compatibility and cooperative coworkers. ,
.The .theory of- equalizing compensation differentials- suggests that the
evaluation by prospective employees and firms of pecuniary and nonpecuniary
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aspects of jobs are factored into their actions taken in the labor market, and
at the margin the net advantage across heterogenous jobs or employees is
approximately equalized. As indicated above, this theory is applicable when
firms or employers are primarily, but need not be exclusively, motivated for
profit. The implications are that when location of work and nonmonetary aspects
of jobs are held constant, jobs that require larger investments in general skill
or training pay wage rates that are higher than those requiring less skill or
training. Furthermore, the wage differential is large enough to provide a
competitive rate of return on investment to workers. Holding skill and location
constant, jobs that have undesirable nonmonetary characteristics pay higher wage
rates than those jobs that supply more desirable working conditions.
Prospective employees, however, tend to be heterogenous in their preferences
and evaluation of nonmonetary aspects of jobs, so the size of the compensating
differential depends on the distribution of preferences among workers, given the
demand for labor and nonmonetary aspects of employment (Elliott 1991, Ch. 11;
Becker 1971, p. 177-179; Rosen 1986). For example, the labor literature shows
that the wage is higher for jobs that have a significantly higher probability of
immediate work-related death, e.g., for skyscraper steel workers and aquanauts
(Elliott 1991, p. 332; Rosen 1986).
Furthermore, the theory of equalized differentials predicts that if a firm
offers benefits to its employees that a minority of the population of potential
workers will use directly, it will pay a lower wage rate than otherwise and
attract primarily workers that value this benefit highly. For ex^ple,
competitive firms that offer "free child care services" to their employees will
pay lower wage rates to their employees than they would otherwise pay, unless
they charge the employees who uses the service for the cost of the child care.
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The theory .of equalizing wage differentials is just: another.- example of the
. economic metaphor that there is no such thing as a "free lunch. A competitive
firm places itself at a disadvantage when it pays both a higher wage rate and
provides more costly benefits^than other firms. The.wage and benefit package
offered by the government sector, however, does not lieed .to meet the rigors of
competition, and it can offer any package, that taxpayers will pay-for (Harberger
1971).
General Versus Specific Training or Information. A unit of general human
capital, e.g., formal schooling,^ increases the-productivity of a worker by
approximately the same, amount in a wide range of producing units or firms. In
contrast, specific human capital increases an Individual's productivity Xo only
one firm, business, or farm and has approximately no effect on the individual's
productivity in other firms or businesses.. Each-farmer has his.own procedures
or standards-for many farm tasks, e.g., for planting corn, soybeans, cotton and
other row crops, and employees who participate in these activities must learn
them.
Farm operators or growers also obtain "farmland specific •-information"
whenever they farm a particular parcel of land for several years, a type of
specific human capital. . Each piece. of .farmland is unique in its productive
^^^J^3.cteristics, The reason is that plant, and animal biology is generally
geoclimatic sensitive, and. they interact with local soil,ijclimate, cultural
practices and management practices differently (see Griliches 1960; Evensonl989:
Acker and Cunningham 1991, p. 370-371; Barnes:1957) •. Thus, the land, technology,
weather outcomes, and management all interact together to- determine the
particular agricultural production outcome, j
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Furthermore, the only way that a farmer, rancher, or grower can obtain this
Information is through actual experience farming the land, I.e., through an
extended period of time spent observing and measuring the outcomes. When he (or
she) moves to a new parcel of farmland, his (her) knowledge about the previously
farmed land becomes obsolete and largely useless. Furthermore, this specificity
of experience to a particular piece of farmland means that sons and daughters of
farmers have a comparative advantage in learning about the productive aspects of
the land operated by the family and help explain why farm businesses and farmland
are passed from one generation to the next with much higher frequency than any
other business or major occupation in the United States, making the occupation
and control of the major asset for a business, the farmland, appear to be highly
inheritable (Hoiberg and Huffman 1978, p. 8, 20).
The distinction between general and specific human capital is crucial to an
understanding who pays the costs and receives the benefits from training or
information and of the functioning of modem labor markets (Elliott 1991, p. 167;
Becker 1975; Goldin 1990). Its importance arises from implications for who bears
the cost (and receives the returns) from investments in these two types of human
capital i.e., for understanding compensating differentials and effects on lay-off
and quit rates. Furthermore, arrangements for sharing costs/returns between
employees and employers generally involve implicit, rather than written,
contracts (see Goldin 1991. p. lU-115; Elliott 1991. p. 256-262; Alchian and
Demsetz 1972).
Except for unionized labor, there are very few written contracts dealing with
terms of employment, sharing of hiring and training costs, and prerequisites for
promotion because they are effectively unenforceable. It is very difficult to
precisely define, monitor, and enforce the quantity and quality of labor of
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employees, .and much of the information that exists is qualitative and internal
to the employing firm (Elliott 1991, p. 167-168 ^. Goldin 1990, p. 114-117).
Employers have generally found it more efficient and effective to use implicit
contracts and establish incentives for cooperative behavior and (or) company
loyalty, e.g., piece-rate wage for workers in manufacturing and harvesting many
fruit and vegetable crops, cash bonuses, profit sharing, and promotion to a
"higher level position" or a higher wage or salary.
Hedonic Wage Equations
The concept of equalizing differentials due to employee and job (or employer)
attributes has been given empirical content through "hedonic" wage or labor
demand equations for labor services of individuals holding particular jobs. The
"hedonic" or characteristic approach to explaining or determining the wage (or
price of a good or service) is .based upon the ..empirical hypothesis, or research
strategy, which asserts that the.multitude of skills or. attributes of workers and
jobs (or models and varieties of a. particular commodity) can be comprehended in
terms of a small number of characteristics or basic attributes (Griliches 1971,
p. 4; Rosen 1974). By viewing the problem in.this way, the magnitude of the
numher of truly "different" types of labor services, Jobs^ or subwarkets
available are greatly reduced because "new ones" are Just viewed as a nev
combination of "basic" attributes that have been present; for some time.
In its parametric, or wage equation, version, the methodology asserts the
existence of a reasonably good fitting empirical relationship between the hourly
wage and an employee's skill and employer's'.various but not too numerous
attributes. Labor economists have accumulated a large amount of evidence about
(1) the relevant set of basic attributes for employees and jobs, (2) the
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algebraic form of the relationship between the wage and attributes, and (3)
special problems of sample selectivity or non-representativeness of actual
workforce participants relative to the population of potential participants (see
Fencavel 1986). The relationship can be summarized as;
(37) In W— ^3^ ^
where W is the average (hourly) wage, is a vector of personal attributes that
are exogenous to current workforce participation decisions (e.g. , years of formal
schooling, years of potential or actual post-school workforce experience, race),
X2 is a vector of job or employer associated attributes that are exogenous to
current workforce participation decisions (e.g., geographical location of work,
anticipated and unanticipated local labor market conditions, local cost of living
indicators, and indicators of local amenities), A is a variable that controls for
sample selectivity of workforce participants from the pool of potential workforce
participants, is a random zero mean disturbance term that represents the impact
of many other factors that affect wage rates but that are individually of minor
Importance to the wage or labor demand facing an individual.
The hedonic wage equation (37) is a type of reduced-form equation, and its
parameters (^s) need not be constant over time. Empirical studies by labor
economists, however, have shown considerable stability over time and across
similar but not exactly the same individuals. They, however, have found strong
evidence for different wage equations for men and women, and the primary reason
is greater within-gender homogeneity of particular attributes than across-gender
homogeneity. See Gunderson'(1989), Rosen (1986), Willis (1986), Goldin 1990;
Smith and Ward 1984, 1989; Fuchs 1989; Juster and Stafford (1991), Fencavel
(1986), and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) and the discussion below of gender
wage differences.
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The'Size and Density of I<abor Markets.- When some of the prospective workers and
some of the jobs are tied to specific geographical arease.g., members of farm
families tend to be- tied- to particular/parcels of-land, married adults are
largely tied to' each other, jobs are tied to particular geoclimatic aspects of
the local environment or distance" from large centers of consiamption--aspects of
local labor markets'matter" for labor market outcomes. Kenny and Denslow (1980),
Adams (1985) , Topel (1986), Tokle and Huffman (1992) and others have found state
units to be adequate representations of local labor markets in the United States.
Fixed employment-related costs .and'density of demand for particular skills,
frequently referred to as the size pf the market, also have a major impact on the
distribution of skills available in and .the functioning of the labor market.
Adam Smith (1776) noted more than 200 years ago that the extent of specialization
that can be achieved" (obtained or supported) in a market -is .proportional to ,the
size of. the market (also see Stigler 1951,' 1962; Rosen 1983; and Becker-1989).
Thus, only very' large labor markets or urbanized areas can support extremely
specialized human capital, e.g., specialized accountants,'taxpreparers, lawyers,
medical doctors. The reason is the very large Investment in skill that is
required relative to the size 'of the demand'*by any one household, firm, or
individual for these services (Rosen .1983). • Modern communications - and
microcomputer systems have extended the accessibility to rural areas of some of
these services.
rural and some other areas where people are tied to particular areas due
to the location of farm land and family relationships and fixed-costs and other
transaction costs are high, employees' skills<(men and women), and jobs are most
likely less perfectly matched than urban areas and can lead to employees being
overquallfled for the jobs, that they hold.- The relative degree of the mismatch
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and the frequency of significant mismatches are likely to be larger in rural
areas and small towns than in large urban areas. The outcome of this mismatch
is subject to several different interpretations. The issue of "thin" rural labor
markets is a research topic that Brlggs has examined (see Briggs 1981. 1986).
In some areas of the United States, especially in the Great Plains and Mountain
States, low density of people and Jobs and high transactions costs seem likely
to reduce the efficiency of the functioning of rural labor markets.
Gender Differences. Goldin concludes from her extensive U.S. historical review
that significant gender wage differences did not exist before the turn of the
centrury when labor markets were primarily spot markets. In these markets,
workers were generally paid the value of their marginal product at each instant
in time, e.g., daily or weekly exchanges of labor. If a job required skill
learned on the job, the worker generally paid (Goldin 1990, p. 114-115).
Turning to recent years, Fuchs (1989), Smith and Ward (1989), Goldin (1990),
Gunderson (1989) all conclude from their extensive research that although a small
amount of labor market discrimination may exist against women, especially black
women, differences in the quantity and quality of skills are the major factors
in understanding gender wage differences in the United States. These differences
exist because individuals have other sources of utility or satisfaction than
their own job in the market and their own workforce earnings.
The Off-Farm Wage Equation
Two wage equations, one for adult males and one for adult females, are In
principle needed In order to be able to predict the off-farm wage rates by
gender, or opportunity cost of unpaid adult farm labor for male and female farm
operators, partners, and shareholders doing farm work.
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A somewhat arbitrary decision. must> be* made on choice :o£ the size of the
relevant, local labor market. Some- researchers have experimented with "commuting
areas," which are groups of counties that might go across state boundaries.
Others have found local labor markets defined along \state .boundraies to'-be
conceptually appealing and to .work well empirically. State units-get away from
the sometimes bleak employment opportunities available in the nearest town and
recognize that individuals living on farms currently commute relatively long
distances on a daily basis for good jobs. Either definition might be used, but
to make the following procedure concrete, local labor markets are defined along
state boundaries.
For a given individual within a particular state (locality), labor market
conditions are approximated by a perfectly elastic demand curve for his or her
labor of a given t3rpe (see Figure 2). This is an approximation to the actual
situation and follows a long tradition in ecometric labor economics (see Willis
1986; Pencavel 1986). The reason for not distinguishing between "part-time" and
"full-time" wage rates is that workers decide whether to work full-time or part-
time when both options are in principle available in the market. Hourly wage
• ' * • • • I 7/'- • .
rates for part-time work are generally less than for full-time work because of
a negative compensating differential. Each individual's potential labor supply
1- • • '^1
represents a very small share of total labor services available in the state.
• * I *
This wage for full-time work, however, is a function of his/her attributes--
schooling, experience, location--and local economic conditions. Individuals who
possess larger quantities of market human capital on average face a higher wage,
or perfectly elastic demand, for their labor than those having less market human
capital.
.,v.C
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Although the hedonlc wage equations used by different researchers differ in
their exact specifications, a specific example is instructive here. One
particular empirical specification of the wage equation that has considerable
promise is eqiiation (38) :
(38) In WAGe| - EXPj^ + EXP^ + ED^ + RACEj^ + PJOBGRj^
+ PURATEi+ ESHOCK^ + RURATEi + in PLANDjl
+0^2 URBAN^ + JAK^ + JAN^ + JULY^
+ JULY^ + NC^ +a|g SOUTH^ + WESTi
+ TIMEi + "*• ^i' ^ .... n, j - M. F.
where personal attributes Include: years of schooling completed (ED), potential
experience (EXP and EXP squared), and race (RACE). Potential experience is more
exogenous to current wage and hours outcomes than actual work experience
(Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). Also, almost all individuals are primarily
involved in some time of work activity--housework, farmwork, wage work--during
all post-schooling years until retirement. Although a year of experience In each
type of work is not of equal quality for affecting market wage rates, it is
difficult to judge exactly how to weigh them. Thus, potential experience can be
considered a proxy for general human capital obtained from all post-school work-
experience (also see Willis 1986; Pencavel 1986; Elliott 1991).
Attributes of the state of employment that affect the wage include variables
that workers and employers can be expected to know or predict at planning time:
predicted job growth (PJOBR), predicted rate of civilian unemployment rate
(PURATE) and variables that neither firms nor households could be expected to
know: local labor demand shocks (ESHOCK) and unanticipated local business cycle
shocks (RURATE) that will occur during the year. Also, the price of land Is a
major part of the costs of housing-plus-access. This can be proxied by the state
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average land-price from an earlier year (FLAND). An additional component to the
price of home sites is associated with the extent of urbanization in a state.
This can be proxied by the percentage of the population living in urban areas in
a past year (URBAN). The simplest local ' amenity to. measure is climate.
Anticipated climate can be proxied by the 30-year normal average January (JAN,
JAN squared) and July (JULY, JULY squared) temperatures. In additional, a wage
equation fitted to annual data would include a variable' for time trend (TIME).
In any given-year,' not all adults are: observed to be working in the market.
The ones who are (not) working are in this group because of a conscious decision
or because of unanticipated -events.' If the decision In the workforce is largely
under the control of .the worker or the worker fs'household, we cannot assume that
nonworkers have unmeasured characteristics- ;that are equal to those who are
working. This circumstance creates a potential problem with selectivity, bias If
the wage equation is fitted to data only for" those, "individuals who are observed
to be currently in the workforce;- One route to alleviate the problem is. to
include a variable that controls for the probability that an individual is in the
workforce during any particular year (see Killingsworth and Heckman 1986).
When the wage equation, corrected for selectivity, Is fitted to data for
workers, It can be used to predict the wage for both workers and nonworkers.
Data on individuals that are available for fitting these wage equations are the
USDA s Farm Operator Resource Survey and Census" Bureau's Current Population
Survey. The Farm Operator Resource Survey does collect data on annual off-farm
earning and hours of off-farm work for all adults in- the farm operator's
household. The Farm Operator Resource Survey would need to collect gender
specific information for individuals engaging in;.unpaid farm work. Farm
households and its members -face very strong incentive.-, to specialize in skill
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acquisition, even holding years of formal schooling constant. Furthermore, these
Incentives have a strong gender specific component given the wide range of tasks
that must be undertaken in a successful farm household.
The predicted hourly off-farm wage from an equation like (38) is a
statistically consistent estimate of what individuals with given skills and
location can expect to earn on average. This methodology is one that enables us
to draw inferences about the opportunity cost or forgone wage per hour for all
potential workers in a given year. When the attributes of a potential worker are
inserted into the wage equation containing estimated coefficient, obtained from
data for observed workers, and the coefficient of the sample-selection variable
is ignored, the resulting predicted wage can be interpreted as an estimate of the
average wage rate that the prospective worker could expect to receive, given
employment. See Figures 3 and 4 for examples of what wage-age profiles might be
expected to look like for adult married men and women who are in farm households.
The profiles are derived using the wage equation reported in Appendix 1 (and in
Tokle and Huffman 1992) and national means for attributes of adult farm men and
women (see Table 3). The wage equations were fitted to data for married couples
in the nonmetropolitan nonfarm population. In making the prediction of off-farm
wage rates for husbands and wives that live on a farm and have farm income, we
assume that the value of these attributes is not affected significantly by
fitting the wage equation to individuals in the nonfarm population.^ With the
relatively high participation rates of farm husbands and wives in off-farmwork,
this assumption is not too bad (see Table 1 and Huffman 1991a).
As a practical matter, wage equations would not need to be fitted every year
to data in order to obtain good forecasts of off-farm wage rates. Real wage
rates for particular attributes are relatively stable over time. Better wage
45
eqiiatlons can be obtained by pooling, data- together for individuals in the 48
contiguous states than by fitting equations to observations for each - state
separately. Most likely, wage equations would need to be fitted at least once
in five years. Provided high quality methodology was'-used, the fitting of wage
equations could (but need not) be part of the research activity of ERS.
Conclusion
Farm labor seems best defined to labor and related services. • Furthermore,
these inputs should be treated as variable inputs and not fixed or overhead costs
I • 1 ' •
of agricultural production. Farmers should be surveyed for their estimate of the
annual amount of labor used on their farm. In the short run, they should be
asked to allocate the time among the commodities that they produce. In the long
term, cost of production estimates should move away from all methods that require
arbitrary allocation of labor to particular commodities." This could be achieved
by using econometric estimates of cost or profit functions for multicommodity
technology.
All purchased .'(from outside sources) be valued'at producers' cost. All-adult
unpaid" farm labor should be valued at its opportunity cost, defined to be the
predicted off-farm wage rate. Methods are suggested for lightening the burden
of this task and for helping to insure good predictions. In particular, except
for children employed on the farm, reported payments to spouses of operators,
partners, and shareholders for farm work should not be used in cost of production
estimates.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Stigler (1966, p. 104) -concludes that historic' costs or- costs measured only
as cash outlays have, powerful ^sway. over untutored mindsFor. example., A lazy
shopkeeper has identical goods available at two different prices, men (and
women) incurladditional losses trying to "get their money" out of a venture,
a,nd. rent freezes are an effective way of making housing available to low-
income households. These examples suggest a concept of cost that flies in
the face of a basic principle of'^rational behavior, "By-gones are forever by
gones," or more to the point, there is no such thing as a "free lunch" even
in France (Stigler 1966, p. 104 and 108).
2. Clearly, this assumption is introduced to reduce needless complexities. If
the real interest rate were high, it might be important to incorporate the
interest rate. • -
3. The market is a relatively objective and efficient evaluator of private
resources.
4. A good analogy is that an individual can withdraw his (her) hand from a
bucket of ice water, but the water level in the bucket will in fact drop.
It is impossible to have the hand'-free of the water and the original water
level, unless a handicap is used.
5. The farm operator households used by Tokle and Huffman (1991) are taken from
the Current Population Survey. They were defined to be a household that had
both a farm residence and (any)' self-employment income'from' farming. Thus,
these households do not include households living on farms 'but providing
only hired farm labor or only off-farm work. The Census of Agriculture and
Farm Costs and Returns Survey use'.a different definition. Some (more than
10 percent) of their farm operators have a nonfarm residence. Although
these farm operator populations do not match perfectly, the behavior
relationships are unlikely to be affected by small differences in the
definition of a farm operator.
Table 1, Attributes of U.S. Hired Farm Workers, 1961 and 1981
Attributes 1961 1981
Age - mean (yrs) 31.7 28.7
Distr: 14-17 yrs 25.1 24.3
(%)
18-24 yrs 20.1 30.5
25-44 yrs 28.8 29.5
> 45 yrs 26.0 15.7
Education (yrs) 7.5 9.8
Nonwhite^ (%) 34.2 14.0
Women (%) 30.3 23.0
Migratory status (%) 10.8 4.6
Nonwhite = Blacks, Indians, Japanese, Chinese, and other nonwhites.
It does not include Hispanics. In 1981, Hispanics accounted for 13%
of the whites.
Source: 1961 from USDA (1963, pp. 4-5); 1981 from USDA 1983, pp. 8, 15, 18)
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Figure 1. Lerner-Pearce diagram of cost minimizing production
of two outputs using two inputs
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Appendix 1. Labor Demand or Market Wage Eauations: Nonmetropolitan Nonfarm Males
and Females 1978-79, 1981-82^
In Wage
Variables Males Females
I
Individual attributes
EXP (AGE-ED-6) .031 .017
(20.04) (12.88)
expVioo -.042 - .027
(10.30) (9.35)
ED .055 .071
(40.21) (30.12)
RACE - .204 -.065
(13.72) (3.48)
Labor market conditions
PJOBGR .016 .009
(2.68) (1.19)
PURATE .012 .004
(4.21) (1.16)
aSHRSER .005 .002
(1.91) (0.72)
ESHOCK .005 .005
(1.79) (1.31)
RURATE - .006 - .011
(1.15) (1.68)
Cost of livinff and locational amenities
In PLAND .073 .053
(5.46) (3.02)
URBAN .255 .011
(5.77) (0.20)
JAN .003 - .002
(1.15) (0.55)
JAnViOO -.001 .002
(3.91) (0.57)
JULY - .087 .197
(1.43) (2.41)
JULY^/lOO .057 -.136
(1.41) (2.49)
Regional dummies and trend
NC -.023 - .038
(1.37) (1.67)
SOUTH .057 -.015
(2.65) (0.51)
WEST .064 - .002
if
(2.09) (0.05)
TIME -.026 - .012
\ -Sf >
A ♦ (6.29) (2.22)
XJ .279 - .206
(5.53) (0.79)
Intercept 3.175 -7.625
(1.41) (2.50)
R-^ .1619 .0781
N 24,571 17,508
^ The t-ratios are in parenthesis.
Source: Adapted from Tokle and Huffman (1991, pp. 663).
